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Supranat ional Regulat ion
Televis ion and the European Union
j Mark Wheeler
A B S T R A C T
j This article analyses, assesses and explains the imperatives which have
affected the European Union’s (EU) audiovisual policy instruments, with
particular emphasis on the Television without Frontiers (TWF) Directive,
cross-media ownership regulations and the regulatory frameworks
concerning converging communication services. It considers the factors
which have led to competition policy becoming more important in the era
of convergence and globalization. Finally, it considers whether these
regulatory responses and policy interpretations illustrate the extent to
which the Commission has been able (or not) to balance the increasingly
conflicting imperatives of economic competitiveness with the core values
of cultural identity. j
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Introduction
The European Union’s (EU) regulation of European television and
audiovisual services was established within a number of vague provisions
in Article 151 of the basic European Treaty (European Union, 1997a).
Recently, the European Commission’s (EC) competence for audiovisual
services has incrementally grown as technological reforms enabled
operators to develop at a pan-European level. In developing a regulatory
approach to television and audiovisual services, the EU’s response
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signalled a conflict between the economic priorities of industrial
competitiveness on the one hand and the desire to maintain the principles
of European cultural identity on the other:
Broadcasting and the audiovisual has therefore been a notable site where
one of the ‘grand narratives’ of the Community has been played out, the
battle between the interventionists and free marketers, between ‘dirigistes’
and ‘ultra liberals’. (Collins, 1994: 23)
Technological reform, cross-sectoral convergence, economic opportu-
nity and the globalization of communications services have brought new
entrants, strategic alliances, acquisitions and corporate media marriages
and mergers into the European television marketplace. Thus, within an
expanding market, one of the constant themes underpinning the EU’s
policy responses has been liberalization of the rules governing Europe’s
television industries. This, the Commission felt, would improve European
media companies’ competitiveness against the challenges of foreign
broadcasters, most especially from the US, and allow the companies to
establish a worldwide presence.
Simultaneously, the EU’s audiovisual policies sought to preserve the
social, cultural and political priorities which have been associated with
the provision of pluralism through diverse and ‘high-quality’ television
services in democratic societies. While the Commission has been
concerned with content regulation, it has been legally required to utilize
economic or structural forms of regulation to intervene over cultural matters.
Consequently, the EU has been concerned with the issues surrounding
media concentration to ensure open and fair competition. Further, the
Commission has developed a limited number of measures maintaining
the public service tradition with regard to the matters of state aids and
subsidies. Yet as public service broadcasters (PSBs) have been understood
as constraining the internal market, a number of EU institutions, most
especially the Competition and Information Society Directorates have
become hostile towards them.
This article comments on the EC’s audiovisual policy instruments,
with special emphasis on the Television without Frontiers (TWF)
Directive, cross-media ownership regulations and the regulatory frame-
works concerning converging communication services. It discusses how
the role of competition policy has become more important in the era of
convergence. Finally, it considers whether these regulatory responses and
policy interpretations illustrate the extent to which the EC has been able
(or not) to balance the increasingly conflicting imperatives of economic
competitiveness with the core values of cultural identity.
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The EU’s competing motives: market efficiency alongside core
values
The EU has always been concerned about the relative weakness of
European television industries within the global marketplace as European
television companies are too small to compete internationally. In
particular, the European television industry has become characterized by
the growing disjunction between a small number of well-capitalized
broadcasters who control electronic delivery systems against a larger
number of undercapitalized organisations, who will become smaller and
more fragmented (Davis, 1998: 80).
These difficulties have meant that European television markets stood
at a considerable disadvantage against US producers, who were more
efficient in the distribution of their product to large international
audiences as they could pursue greater economies of scale and the
substantive price advantages because of the size of their own domestic
market. This led to an imbalance between the demands for programmes
(which reflected the growth in channels and airtime to fill) against the
limitations governing European production capacity. In turn, there has
been a reliance on US imports for fictional programming such as dramas
and situation comedies due to their cheapness in cost over domestic
production.
Thus, with the expansion of television and audiovisual services,
which was associated with the diversification of revenue streams available
to media companies (resulting in an exponential rise in the number of
television hours to be filled), the EU believed that its role should be to
facilitate the unification of the fragmented national European television
industries. This would create a more sustainable European television
economy which could develop the programming infrastructure to
compete with the influx of US imports. In particular, Commission
officials suggested that through the removal of national forms of
protectionism the European companies might compete on a global basis
and felt that once market barriers had been lowered the:
European countries would satisfy their demand for programming from
increases in European production . . . rather than gravely increased
dependence on US imports. (Humphreys, 1996: 261)
To foment the rapid growth of the European television market, the
EU’s (de)regulatory principles of liberalization and harmonization have
underpinned its approach to the audiovisual sector throughout a series of
directives such as TWF and policy approaches concerning media
concentration and regulation of competition. These provisions, for a
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European-wide liberalization of broadcasting markets, were in accord
with the EU’s overarching goal of single market integration which had
been enshrined by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (European Union,
1992a).
Simultaneously, within this era of single market integration and
commercial opportunity, the Commission sought to preserve and protect
what it perceived to be the traditional core values and strengths of the
European broadcasting economies. These included:
• Pluralism, the most fundamental public objective in the media
sector;
• Cultural diversity, especially regarding the preservation of
national identities; and
• The enhancement of citizen’s choice, in which consumers will be
able to enjoy a wide degree of access to the new opportunities
provided by market innovation (Ungerer, 2002: 4).
The Treaty on the European Union, which came into force on 1
November 1993, makes a specific reference to the audiovisual sector. It
specifies that, under its provisions, the Community will be required to
take all cultural aspects into account in its actions concerning audiovisual
services (European Union, 1992a). In 1999, the Prodi Commission
defined its position concerning the regulation of content in a Commu-
nication titled ‘Principles and Guidelines for the Community’s Audio-
visual Policy in the Digital Age’, which was endorsed by the Council and
the European Parliament (European Union, 1999d). The Communication
reaffirmed that regulation within the audiovisual sector must safeguard
such public interest objectives as: pluralism; cultural and linguistic
diversity; copyright protection; the right of reply; and the protection of
minors. Thus, the Commission commented that the extent of any
subsequent regulation should be determined by the failure of the market
to realize these objectives. Moreover, it was contended that regulation
must remain proportionate (e.g. the minimum necessary to achieve the
Commission’s goals) (Reding, 2000).
The EU has also developed a series of support measures which were
designed to enable the audiovisual sector to compete with the US. In
particular, the EU established the MEDIA I and MEDIA II programmes
which allocated n200 million for a five-year period between 1991 and
1996 and n310 million for a four-year period between 1996 and 2000
(focusing on training, development and distribution) respectively. Since
January 2001, the n400 million MEDIA Plus programme has been
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enforced to strengthen the European audiovisual industry through the
continued support and co-financing of training, development, distribu-
tion and the promotion of programmes. However, as some commentators
have noted, these subsidies were only a fraction of the total monies which
existed in the sector (Levy, 1999: 49).
Further, the divisions between liberalizers and dirigistes were
complicated by the expansion of services that emerged as a consequence
of the digitalization and convergence of communication services (tele-
vision, telecommunications and information). The increase within digital
television platforms has meant that EU regulators have become concerned
with the conditional access systems which allow consumer access to
services through set-top boxes and the need to ensure that there should be
no bottlenecks over content in the supply of communication services to
users.
Public service broadcasters
The tensions between the liberalizers and interventionists have been most
problematic with regard to PSBs. DGX (now Education and Culture) has
been, with the European Parliament, largely in favour in pluralism and to
a lesser degree supportive of PSBs. Elsewhere, DGIV (now Competition)
was ‘implacable [in its] pursuit of public service broadcasters’ (Collins,
1994: 155–6; 1999: 161) and from the late 1980s to early 1990s, the
Directorate addressed complaints from commercial organizations about
PSBs. For DGXIII (now Information Society), who favoured liberalizing
measures which would expand the television marketplace by removing
the ‘constraints’ on growth for media companies, PSBs were dominant
players who undermined an unfettered marketplace (Radaelli, 1999: 129;
Humphreys, 1996: 260).
In attempting to rectify these difficulties, the EU established the
1997 Protocol of Amsterdam, which was annexed to the Treaty of
Amsterdam, to consider the role of public subsidies in the competitive
balance between public and commercial broadcasters (European Union,
1997b). In particular, commercial channels in Spain, France, Germany,
Italy and Denmark had complained to the EC about the dual forms of
funding (licence fees and advertising) which supported their national
PSBs and, the commercial forces claimed, gave the PSBs an unfair
advantage. The protocol was designed to rectify any unfairness between
competitive gain and the maintenance of diverse and pluralistic services
through the public service tradition. It commented that public subsidies
could only be granted to PSBs when:
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. . . such funding does not affect trading conditions and competition in the
Community to an extent which would be contrary to the common interest,
while the realisation of the remit of that public service shall be taken into
account. (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 72)
Thus, the protocol made clear that the EU would continue to allow PSBs
access to public funds only when they did not distort the commercial
market (European Union, 1997b). Simultaneously, the protocol created
confusion concerning how competition policy could be employed to
investigate complaints about PSBs (Levy, 1999: 96).
Subsequently, the EU supported the 1998 High Level Group on
Audiovisual Policy, whose report The Digital Age: European Audiovisual
Policy recommended that there should be a maintenance of the distinctive
dual systems of public and private broadcasters within the member states
(European Union, 1998). It commented that it should be up to the
member states to determine the balance of power between the public and
commercial sectors in accord with the market forces underpinning their
national television marketplaces. Yet, in the same year, the Competition
Directorate placed stricter limits on PSBs with regard to state aid rulings.
Most especially, public aid would be prohibited when subsidies, alongside
advertising revenues, exceeded the costs of meeting public service
obligations (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 72). Despite the Directorate’s
attempts to introduce draft guidelines in the application of state aids, the
majority view in the Commission remained that complaints against PSBs
should be considered on a case-by-case basis. However, in spite of the
compromises that have marked the EC’s response to PSBs:
. . . the internal market is hostile to public service broadcasting . . . [as
when] . . . seen from the vantage point of the neo-classical economic theory
underpinning the EEC Treaty, public service broadcasting is aberrant and
offensive. (Collins, 1999: 162) < Hyperlink > Such hostility to PSBs was
especially evident in the Commission’s development of directives and
measures which sought to treat broadcasting as being no different from any
other service or commodity.
The Television Without Frontiers (TWF) Directive
The 1989 TWF Directive (89/552/EEC) remains the liberalizing
centrepiece of the EU’s legal framework for the audiovisual sector
(European Union, 1989). TWF was subsequently amended in 1997 by
the European Parliament and the Council in Directive 97/36/EC to
provide member states with national measures to protect public access to
free-to-air television coverage of major events which have societal worth
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including the Olympics and the World Cup (European Union, 1997d). In
2000, the Education and Cultural Directorate announced that, in the
light of the potential change in the European television economy which
had accompanied the introduction of digital based services, there would
be a further review of the Directive, from which deliberations would be
realized during 2003.
Most crucially, TWF provided rules which were aimed at encourag-
ing growth within the European television marketplace and stimulating
audiovisual production in countries with a small production capacity.
Article 2, which stands at the heart of the Directive, effectively abolished
the EU member states’ sovereignty over their national systems, thereby
facilitating the free movement of television broadcasting services across
frontiers within the Union. To this end, the EU employed the Maastricht
Treaty’s concept of mutual recognition, which meant that, as long as
minimal regulatory rulings were met by the provisions of the originating
member state, the legal justifications for another member state to impede
the reception or retransmission of broadcasts were removed (Collins,
1994: 59–60).
Other liberalizing recommendations were also designed to harmo-
nize the development of a single European market in broadcasting and
related activities, such as television advertising, programme sponsorship
and the independent production of television programmes. The Directive
allowed for the unrestricted flow of programmes carrying advertising
across borders and settled on a maximum 15 percent advertising limit of
daily airtime, with a maximum of 20 percent per hour during peak
schedules. With regard to sponsorship, the Directive simply commented
that programme sponsors should not be able to shape editorial influence
over programme content, while banning the sponsorship of news and
current affairs programming. The Commission’s liberalizers were, how-
ever, disappointed by the limited 10 percent transmission time or
alternatively budget quotas on broadcasters for European works by
independent productions (Harcourt and Radaelli, 1997: 8).
Despite the liberalizing arguments that have underpinned the EC’s
approach in establishing the Directive, culturalists within the EU were
able to include provisions to ensure a more interventionist regulatory
response to the European television economies (Radaelli, 1999: 125).
Thus, TWF included stronger content regulations to be applied within
member states’ national broadcasting systems (Article 3). Articles 4 and
6 established rules governing the definitions, amounts and nature of
European content in television broadcasts. Within Article 6, the
Directive provided a definition for ‘European works’, suggesting that
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these were productions that originated from member states and third
party states (non-EU European countries) as defined by the Council of
Europe’s European Convention on Transfrontier Television.
In Article 4, member states were required to ensure that broad-
casters should, where practicable and through appropriate means, reserve
a majority proportion of their transmission time for European works
(excluding news, advertising and sports events). In effect, it established a
clear quota of European works across EU member states.
Other interventionist measures included the establishment of a
public right to reply and the protection of minors from undesirable
programming. Moreover, the 1997 Amendment, added several public
interest requirements including access rights to ‘events of major
importance for society’ and provided member states with the national
measures to define a list of designated televised events for that purpose.
Thus, TWF was not only important in 
. . . its assertion of the economic imperatives of a single broadcasting
market but in the Commission’s assertion that cultural matters were indeed
part of its jurisdiction, albeit via an economic back door . . . [therefore]
cultural concerns . . . [have come] to have an important place in
Community broadcasting policy (in spite of the absence of the Treaty of
Rome as a basis for Community cultural policy). (Collins, 1994: 3)
Overall, however, the TWF Directive was established to stem any
inefficiency which resulted from what it perceived as unnecessary forms of
national regulation, so that a liberalized single European audiovisual
market could flourish. Even Articles 4 and 6 were not fully inter-
ventionist, as they defined ‘European’ as referring to ‘any legal or natural
person domiciled in any of the member states of the Council of Europe’
(Collins, 1994: 70). This was a permissive definition suggesting that US
companies which are based in Europe may be understood as being
‘European’. Additionally, the articles contained get-out clauses concern-
ing practicability and also stated that their aim for European production
‘should be achieved progressively’ (Humphreys, 1996: 277).
Further, there were major disagreements on the quota provisions as
defined by Article 4, and from 1989 until 1997 the quotas (even among
their supporters) were ‘valued increasingly in terms of the symbolic rather
than real’ (Levy, 1999: 48). Only a few EU dirigistes, who called for the
quotas to become obligatory rather than being observed through choice,
believed that these measures could offset the still limited but growing
reliance by European broadcasters on imports. Instead, these measures
provided a central plank for those within the Commission who felt that
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the audiovisual sector should not be left to the deliberations of the
market. In the event, the 1997 revision of the TWF Directive signalled
an end to this debate when the European Parliament decided to vote
against the toughening up of the quotas (Levy, 1999: 48).
Thus, in many respects, the Commission may be understood as
developing the Directive in 1989, and through its further revision in
1997, from a liberal view which ignored the wider political issues of
pluralism and cultural diversity (Radaelli, 1999: 125). TWF was in effect
‘a victory for commercial forces and those who favoured anti-protectionist
policies’ (Negrine and Papathanassopoulos, 1990: 76).
The regulation of media concentration in a converging
communications market
To ensure an open media marketplace in Europe, thereby stemming
possible media concentration brought about by the growth of vertically
integrated conglomerates, the TWF Directive stated that its aim was to
make sure that competition must not, in any shape, be distorted.
However, Article 5 (which established the 10% quota for independent
production) was the only explicit measure in TWF which dealt with
media concentration and then from an economically liberal viewpoint.
Humphreys (1996:.287).
Therefore to rectify this omission, in the early 1990s, the EU
declared that it would establish a directive concerning the concentration
of media ownership through the harmonization of national rulings.
However, as Levy comments:
. . . there was disagreement between the Community’s institutions as to
whether the primary purpose of Community action was the safeguarding of
pluralism or the competition of a single European audiovisual market.
(Levy, 1999: 51)
The lines of demarcation within this dispute were indicated by the
differences in approach between the 1992 Green Paper on ‘Pluralism and
Media Concentration in the Internal Market’ (COM (92) 480 final,
European Union 1992b) and ‘Europe and the Global Information Society’
written by the Bangemann High-Level Group in 1994 (European Union,
1995).
The former set out to assess the need for Community level action
concerning media ownership with regard to the disparities that existed
among member states. It outlined a lengthy process in which there would
be a facilitation of a network of like-minded operators who would be
consulted with regard to questions on pluralism and media ownership
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(Iosifides, 1997: 91–104). Conversely, the 1994 paper described a
situation across Europe, in which national ownership regulations had
impeded television and telecommunications companies from taking new
opportunities in the internal market, with regard to information services
(European Union, 1995). In turn, it speculated that such regulatory
restrictions would undermine the competitive advantage of European
television organizations against non-European competitors (Iosifidis,
1997: 94).
Commissioner Mario Monti tried to reconcile these goals when he
presented a draft directive in 1996, whose measures included: a 30
percent upper limit on ‘monomedia’ ownership for radio and television
broadcasters in their own territories and a ‘multimedia threshold’ of 10
percent for ownership of combined media (television, radio and news-
papers) (Levy, 1999: 50–2). These proposals floundered as the member
states disputed the appropriate level of diversity within ownership for the
different sized markets (local, regional or national). While the Commis-
sion favoured an overall measure of a 30 percent market share within a
specific region for a television or radio station, some Community
members (notably Germany and the UK) argued that market share
should be measured in accordance with the media companies’ national
marketplaces, irrespective of where the service was transmitted. Follow-
ing on from this, a more flexible draft proposed a 30 percent share which
could be varied in respect to each set of national circumstances.
However, the Commission was unable to secure a compromise
between the European Parliament and the member states over the degree
of flexibility governing ownership thresholds at local, regional or national
levels (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 112–13). In the event, the draft
directive was abandoned in 1998, when the EU decided to establish a set
of rulings on ownership, plurality and diversity through a number of
policy documents and research reports. Invariably, the recommendations
and rulings within these policy documents were limited. This was
because the basic Treaty provisions, in accordance with the principles of
subsidiarity, stated that ownership rules should fall within the regulatory
supervision of the member states. Moreover, due to the political
sensitivity of any rulings concerning media ownership, the EU found it
difficult to establish a consensus among member states (in contrast to the
general support of the liberalizing and harmonizing measures within
TWF) favouring Community-level intervention regarding media owner-
ship. This was also reflected in the lukewarm response from the media
industries themselves when presented with the possibility of a set of
harmonized European-wide rulings governing cross-media ownership.
E U R O P E A N J O U R N A L O F C O M M U N I C A T I O N 1 9 ( 3 )
358
Fir
st 
Pr
oo
f
Therefore, the political controversy that arose concerning these
rulings showed the fundamental dichotomy in the EU’s approach between
the desire for plurality in media provision and the need to establish a
competitive European television sector. These differences were also played
out within the Commission itself, notably between the main EU
Directorates. DGX (Education and Culture) continued to seek to preserve
the concepts of plurality, while DGXIII (Information Society and at the
time headed by Commissioner Martin Bangemann) pursued policies
which were designed to expand information services through market
liberalization, on account of the new market conditions which had
emerged under convergence.
The 1997 EU Green Paper on the regulation of convergence
In the midst of these differences concerning the EU’s response to media
concentration, the situation was complicated as European policy-makers
anticipated that there would be an explosion of new communication
channels accompanying the convergence of broadcasting, telecommunica-
tion and information services. For the EC’s market-liberals, the potential
opportunities for new entrants, which had been opened up by the trends
towards consolidation and diversification that accompanied convergence,
needed to be encouraged. Consequently, views differed about whether
digitalization and the proliferation of new channels and services would
make the need for specific rulings concerning concentration relevant or
not.
The 1997 Green Paper on the ‘Convergence of the Telecommunica-
tions, Media and Information Technology, and the Implications for
Regulations, towards an Information Society Approach’ (COM (97) 623)
commented that new opportunities for communication actors should be
encouraged through a review of the current rules (European Union,
1997c). The paper also felt that, as consumers would enjoy increased
choice across a variety of digital channels, PSBs might decline in terms of
visibility. Thus, the regulatory frameworks should enable public broad-
casters access to the valuable new revenues alongside the current forms of
funding, as long as the publicly drawn incomes did not cross-subsidize
such activities. Most especially, it predicted that convergence would act as
a panacea to Europe’s depressed labour markets and a powerful motor for
economic growth (European Union, 1997c: 4).
The Green Paper argued that regulatory barriers could hinder the
development of a sustained communications economy within Europe and
that traditional structures were insufficiently adaptable to the changing
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needs of the marketplace (European Union, 1999a). Consequently, it
questioned the rationales underpinning the existing rules suggesting that
they were bound by the previous norms of public service, sectoral
differentiation, geographic boundaries and analogue transmission systems
alongside general assumptions about ‘monomedia’ players. It was felt that
such forms of regulatory control might promote uncertainty, thereby
restricting the opportunities for investment in the audiovisual sector and
serving to undermine the prospects of developing the ‘information
society’.
The Green Paper argued, with regard to media concentration, that
vertical merger activity would be an inevitable consequence of con-
vergence. This was due to the fact that only a few of the major media
players had the sufficient resources and skills to ‘straddle the whole value
chain within the converged environment, so that the emergence of major
players will inevitably rely on partnering to varying degrees’ (European
Union, 1997c: 7).
The European Parliament’s calls for a resolution on media
concentration
After the Commission’s failure to establish the Directive on Media
Concentration and the Green Paper’s endorsement of media consolidation
in the converging communications environment, the European Parlia-
ment in its 1999 response to the Convergence Green Paper called for the
Commission to submit a further proposal for such a directive (European
Union, 1999a). Yet, in the following three years the EC failed to address
the issue. Therefore, on 20 November 2002, the Parliament called on the
Commission to consider media concentration by launching a compre-
hensive consultation to assess how new technologies and corporate
mergers, alliances and joint ventures had impacted on the European
audiovisual market. It argued that this should occur to safeguard media
pluralism and offset the growing disparity in national anti-concentration
rulings. The European Parliament stated that Commission should draft
an updated Green Paper by the end of 2003. Within such a document,
the political, economic and legal implications of a European-level
regulatory framework, or other regulatory options, such as a directive,
would be outlined to ensure openness and competition (European Union,
2002b).
However, the inconclusive results of the EU’s legislative proposals
concerning media concentration in the mid- to late 1990s would suggest
that it will be difficult to achieve consensus among the constituent
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stakeholders including the Commission’s directorates, the Parliament, the
member states and the media companies themselves. This has led to a
number of commentators predicting that the EU will continue to be
‘powerless to regulate [on] the issue of concentration, apart from
scrutinising [media] mergers and acquisitions’ (Papathanassopoulos,
2002: 115). They suggest that the most effective mechanism for the EU
to regulate media concentration will ironically continue to be that most
apparently liberalizing of single market principles – competition
policy.
Competition policy in the audiovisual sector
The EU Competition Directorate has become an active player in
intervening over the European television markets. To preserve competi-
tion within the audiovisual sector, the Directorate applies the EC Treaty’s
competition rulings to make decisions with regard to: mergers, state aid,
public enterprises and the liberalization of the market, restrictive
agreements and concerted practices, and the abuse of dominant positions
(Wheeler, 2001: 3). In respect to European television, the Competition
Directorate has been responsible in establishing rules concerning:
• The definition of state aid with regard to PSBs;
• The sale of sport rights to broadcasters; and
• Mergers to stem cross-media and communication concentration
(Wheeler, 2001: 4).
State aid with regard to national public service broadcasters
The Commission has sought to prevent the implementation of anti-
competitive agreements and the abuse of dominant market positions by
public monopoly operators or service providers. On 15 November 2001,
the Directorate published its ‘Communication on the Application of State
Aid Rules to Public Service Broadcasting’ in which it clarified the EU
approach on the application of state aid rules to PSBs (European Union,
2001). These were that:
• Member states are free to define the extent of the public service
and the way it is financed and organized, according to their
preferences, history and needs;
• The Commission called for transparency on these aspects to assess
the proportionality of state funding and to control possible
abusive practices;
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• Member states will be asked whenever such transparency is
lacking to establish a precise definition of the public service
remit, to formally entrust it to one or more operators through an
official act and to have an appropriate authority monitor its
fulfilment; and
• The Commission will only intervene in cases where there is a
distortion of competition arising from the aid which cannot be
justified with the need to perform the public service as defined
by the member state and to provide for its funding (Wheeler,
2001: 6).
Therefore, while member states are regarded as competent for the
definition and choice of funding of the public service, the Commission
retains a duty to check for abusive practices and any absence of
overcompensation on a case-by-case basis. This is in accordance with the
1997 Amsterdam Protocol, which provided the definitions for the
appropriate levels of public subsidies so that market distortion should not
occur and the Commission’s consensus view taken against the introduc-
tion of any state aid guidelines in relation to PSBs. In particular, the state
aid mechanism has come into effect when the private broadcasters claim
that their public rivals have enjoyed a competitive advantage in receiving
both public subsidies and advertising revenues. The commercial organiza-
tions maintain that this has meant that PSBs have a greater capacity to
invest in programming and services, and argue that public financing
must be more transparent and proportional to the public service remit.
In this respect, in February 1999, the Commission opened formal
state aid procedures regarding PSBs within Italy, France and Spain (who
receive revenues from both state subsidy and advertising) and found that
their collection of advertising revenues did not unfairly distort the
national markets. The launch of new digital services by PSBs has also led
to complaints by private rivals. In 1998, the Directorate ruled in favour
of two German thematic channels, Kinderkanal and Phoenix, run by the
ARD and ZDF public operations (Aid no: NN70/98) (European Union,
1999b) and supported Portuguese public broadcaster Radio Televisa˜o
Portuguesa (RTP) when it was challenged by the private company
Sociedade Independente de Communicaça˜o (Davis, 1998: 94). Further, on
29 September 1999, the European Commission rejected a complaint from
BSkyB that the licence funding of the supply of BBC News 24 to cable
television viewers was an abuse of European laws on state aids (European
Union, 1999c). Thus, although, the Competition Directorate has been
innately hostile to PSBs, in the majority of cases concerning state aids
E U R O P E A N J O U R N A L O F C O M M U N I C A T I O N 1 9 ( 3 )
362
Fir
st 
Pr
oo
f
it has found in favour of them as there has been no clear evidence of
market distortion despite the claims of commercial operators. However,
as Levy has commented, state aids remain ‘the area where there is
perhaps the greatest potential for conflict between the policies adopted
by national governments and the way in which [the Competition
Directorate] might interpret the competition provisions of the EC
treaties’ (Levy, 1999: 97).
The sale of sports’ rights to broadcasters
The Competition Directorate has stated that there should be no
unjustified restrictions for competition in the sale of rights by sports
bodies to broadcasting companies. There are, however, two particular
issues related to the marketing of broadcasting rights of sports events: the
collective selling and purchasing of broadcasting rights and the exclusiv-
ity granted in respect of those rights.
There are significant complexities for broadcasters, sports bodies and
competition regulators when a group of football clubs sell rights to
matches to the media collectively to extract more revenue. When rights
are sold on a collective basis, there is a consequent reduction of the
availability of rights in the broadcasting market. The restrictive effects of
collective selling agreements undermine the levels of competition among
broadcasters and consumer choice. In effect, they amount to price fixing,
as they restrict the availability of rights for sports events and strengthen
the market position of the dominant broadcasters.
In the Spanish national market, the Directorate forced Telecom
giants Telefo´nica and Sogecable to modify their ‘audiovisual sport’
agreement when they attempted to fix the price of football matches
through a common exploitation of football rights in 2000. In December
2002, the Directorate announced it would consider whether Britain’s
Football Association Premier League’s (FAPL) joint selling of matches to
British and Irish television companies should continue on an exclusive
basis. In practice, this has meant that only 25 percent of the Premier
League matches are broadcast live and only the major media groups
(BSkyB) can afford the acquisition and exploitation of such a bundle of
rights. This, the Commission believes, has led to high prices and has
unfairly blocked other competitors from acquiring key content.
On a pan-European scale, the Directorate also investigated the
European Football Union’s (UEFA) collective selling of Champions
League rights to determine whether this contravened the competition
criteria. It announced on 3 June 2002, that UEFA’s collective sale had
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distorted competition between broadcasters, encouraged media concentra-
tion and barred access to key content for the development of Internet and
mobile telephony based sport services. This, the Directorate felt, had
contravened the interests of both fans and consumers alike. Therefore, it
supported UEFA’s new rules which were designed to bring the
Champions League’s media rights within the reach of Internet content
providers, as well as a greater number of television and radio companies.
This meant that, rather than UEFA selling the rights as a bundle to only
one broadcaster per nation, it will sell several packages of rights for
shorter periods of time. Moreover, the football clubs themselves will also
be able to exploit some of these rights by directly targeting their fan base
(European Union, 2002a).
Mergers
However, the Competition Directorate’s most conspicuous interventions
within the audiovisual sector have arisen when it has been called upon to
assess new competitive ventures including alliances and mergers, under
its merger control rules (Humphreys, 1996: 212). The restructuring of
media markets in Europe led to the creation of large media conglomerates
of a ‘European dimension’, whose size (assets of n5 billion or over
worldwide) provided the trigger for EC merger control (Ungerer, 2002:
8). Similarly, competition regulations have been invoked when defensive
alliances have occurred in which two or more companies with strong
positions in their domestic markets combine to strengthen their positions
within the convergent markets (van Miert, 1999: 117).
The Directorate has sought to employ its merger regulations so that
it can investigate any proposed cross-communications alliance or merger
before its goes ahead rather than having to consider it retrospectively. In
interpreting these complex rules, it has realized that rapid technological
change may inc ease forms of market concentration, rather than reduce
them. Thus, the competition ‘watchdogs’ have become concerned with
the danger that too much content may be held in the hands of an
individual ‘gate-keeper’ and that consumer choice will be undermined
(van Miert, 1997).
Merger cases
The Competition Directorate has conducted several investigations at
national, pan-European and international level to provide rulings
concerning the merging or formation of alliances between media,
telecommunications and multimedia corporations. At a national level, it
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intervened in the German pay-TV market between 1994 and 1998 to
prohibit the two leading German commercial television owners, Bertels-
mann and the Kirch group, attempting to develop a joint venture with
the German telecommunications monopoly Deutsche Telekom (DT) to be
called Media Services Gesellschaft (MSG). The companies intended that
the MSG conglomerate should deliver pay-TV channels and interactive
services such as video-on-demand through conditional access and decoder
systems. In both cases, the Directorate found against MSG due to
concerns of market dominance in programme rights, the supply of
programming in pay-TV channels and anti-competitive controls over the
distribution of set-top boxes (Levy, 1999: 88–9).
At a pan-European level, the Directorate has largely approved the
mergers and alliances that have been sought by European media
companies. Thus, it supported the authorizations of the French Te´le´vision
par Satellite; Bertelsmann/RTL; Canal Plus’s acquisition of Nethold and
several joint ventures including Canal Plus/Lagardere/Liberty Media;
Kirch/BSkyB; and RTL/Canal Plus (Monti, 2001). At an international
level, with regard to the mergers between AOL and Time Warner and
Vivendi and Universal, the Directorate moved actively to establish
specific rulings which allowed the mergers to go ahead within the remit
of competition.
In November 2002, the Commission started a detailed investigation
into the planned acquisition of Italian pay-TV company Telepiu` by
Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation. News Corporation intends to
merge Telepiu` with its own pay-TV operation in Italy, Stream. It has
been predicted that within this investigation the Directorate will
consider the impact of the merger on the Italian broadcasting market and
may determine whether News Corporation really favours the emergence
of new competitors or wishes to affect a monopoly (European Union,
2002c). Therefore, according to Competition Commissioner Mario
Monti:
A strong, effective competition policy is fundamental to the success of
many sectors in Europe, and none more so than the audiovisual sector. A
nuanced approach is required, given the complexity and importance of the
sector. But that it is nuanced does not mean that it is laissez-faire. (Monti,
2001)
Conclusion
In establishing its policy instruments for the European television
marketplace, the EU has facilitated a regulatory framework which would
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enhance opportunities for expansion within the single market. Most
especially, the EU identified the fundamental problem within the
European television markets as being one of fragmentation, which it
believes has stymied the growth of European television companies when
they have tried to compete within the global market. Thus, in
attempting to foment the rapid growth of the European television
market, the EU has employed the principles of liberalization and
harmonization. These goals underpinned the TWF Directive which
established liberal rules that aimed to enlarge the European television
marketplace and stimulate audiovisual production in member states with
a small production capacity.
Simultaneously, the Commission sought to intervene in the Commu-
nity’s broadcasting markets to redress what it has understood as being the
undesirable outcomes of an unfettered marketplace. This imperative has
created an inherent tension in the EU policy process between dirigistes
and liberalizers. Significant divisions emerged in the competing EU
directorates who were responsible for the supervision of audiovisual and
television services and have most marked with regard to the state aids for
PSBs.
This dichotomy has been evident within a number of the other
major areas of EU jurisdiction (TWF, media concentration and the
regulation of converging services). For instance, the EU declared that it
would establish a directive concerning media concentration through the
harmonization of national rulings. However, due to the political
sensitivity of rulings concerning media ownership, the EU found it
impossible to establish a consensus among the responsible directorates,
the European Parliament and member states for the directive. These
difficulties were exacerbated by the expansion of services and opportun-
ities for new entrants that emerged as a consequence of the digitalization
and convergence of communication services. In the event, despite the
recent calls from the European Parliament to readdress the Directive on
Media Concentration, the EC has preferred to leave the decisions
concerning concentration to the auspices of its Competition Direc-
torate.
As consequence, the EU Competition Directorate has become an
active player in intervening over the European television market as the
centralizing tendencies of media conglomeration have grown. The
Directorate has conducted several notifications concerning the merging or
formation of joint alliances between media, telecommunications and
multimedia corporations. For some, competition policy is an appropriate
mechanism through which the EU can meet the conflicting imperatives
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of competitive gain with the demands for the maintenance of plurality
and diversity. However, as Jonathan Hardy has commented:
In assessing market power through economic considerations, competition
law is unable to grasp more complex operations of cultural or symbolic
power which the regulation of media (and now multi-media) pluralism has
traditionally sought to address. (Hardy, 2001: 15)
As the converging communication markets take on different
characteristics, the democratic flow of information to the public has
become a chief concern. To this end, it would appear that competition
policy provides only a qualified degree of protection for information
markets conceived of as a public good. This is an issue of vital concern,
since communication must be considered as having a significant social
worth as well as being understood as an economic commodity. These
concerns return attention back to the dichotomy between the Commis-
sion’s interventionists and liberalizers, and suggest that it has been the
latter who have largely won the day, despite significant qualifications, in
establishing EU rulings for the television and the audiovisual sectors.
Finally, while supranational regulation has grown in terms of its
importance in the single European broadcasting market, its impact has
been limited on national television industries due to the basic Treaty
principles governing subsidiarity. These allow member states a wide
degree of autonomy in regulating their own television and communica-
tions markets. However, as Europe’s influence grows, it must be expected
that the EU will seek to rectify its liberalizing tendencies with the needs
for a democratic media. The EU then will have to ensure that coherent
policies emerge that not only reflect the interests of the Europe’s
television industries but of its citizens as well.
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